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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RETALIATORY
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACT
AND PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DR. MICHAEL R. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Comment
On July 23, 1992, the North Carolina General Assembly rati-
fied a law which will protect employees against discrimination and
retaliatory action for particular job related activities. The law be-
came effective on October 1, 1992 and applies to those accused of
.violating it on or after that date. This article analyzes that law as
it applies to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Car-
olina. The law appears in its entirety as an appendix in this paper.
Bankground Information
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19701
(Act) affords employees a comprehensive range of rights and forms
of protection with respect to job safety and health. As one exam-
ple, any employee who believes that a violation of a standard
under the Act exists (and threatens physical harm) in the work-
place may request that an inspection be conducted.2
One Section of the Act 3 protects employees from retaliation
and discrimination as a result of exercising rights afforded by the
Act. That section is frequently referred to as the anti-discrimina-
tion provision or simply as § 11(c). Employees who lodge com-
plaints under the provision, seeking protection from discrimination
and retaliation, are referred to as 'employee complainants.'
The Act extends its protective coverage to employees of all
• The author has contributed this work in his private capacity, and the arti-
cle is not meant to reflect the views of any other person or entity.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1993).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1993).
1
Smith: An Analysis of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act and
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
states and territories.' However, the Act allows states the option of
administering their own occupational safety and health plans.5
North Carolina enacted its own plan, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of North Carolina (OSHANC), in 1973 and federal ap-
proval was granted on February 1, 1973.6
The federal Act requires states which opt to administer their
own safety and health plan to enforce standards as effective as
standards enforced under the federal Act.7 An operational status
agreement between the federal government and North Carolina
sets forth the boundaries between the Act and OSHANC. One par-
agraph of that agreement also requires that OSHANC operations
be "at least as effective as the Federal program."8 With respect to
anti-discrimination, prior to October 1, 1992, OSHANC's provision
was almost a mirror copy of the federal Act's provision2
In the wake of the disastrous fire at Imperial Food Products in
Hamlet, North Carolina (September 3, 1991), criticism of the oper-
ation of the OSHANC anti-discrimination provision was publi-
cized. The criticism regarded actual and anticipated retaliation for
reporting unsafe work conditions to the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Labor's Division of Occupational Safety and Health
(DOSH). Lengthy response times between employee complaints
and action by DOSH was also criticized. The North Carolina De-
partment of Labor acknowledged the delays, pointing to inade-
quate funding for staff members.'0 In October 1991, the federal
government assumed temporary enforcement authority over dis-
crimination complaints."
In July 1992, the North Carolina General Assembly voted to
increase funding to provide personnel for OSHANC operations and
enacted a number of laws related to occupational safety and
health. One such law, entitled "Retaliatory Employment Discrimi-
nation" (referred to in this article as the RED act), became the
4. 29 U.S.C. § 653 (1993).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1993).
6. 38 Fed. Reg. 3041 (1973).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1993).
8. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,843 (1975) (Paragraph 8 of the agreement), amended by
44 Fed. Reg. 74,819 (1979), redesignated 51 Fed. Reg. 2488 (1986) (codified at 29
C.F.R. 1952.155 (1992)).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(8)-(10) (1991).
10. See THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 16, 1991, § D.
11. 56 Fed. Reg. 55,192 (1991).
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new OSHANC anti-discrimination provision. The prior OSHANC
anti-discrimination provisions were eliminated by the RED act.
The RED act now exists as a separate article of Chapter 95 of the
North Carolina General Statutes. (Chapter 95 includes laws re-
garding the North Carolina Department of Labor and labor
regulations.)
DOSH, now with staff trained by the federal government to
investigate employee discrimination complaints, resumed jurisdic-
tion over its anti discrimination program in July 1992.' As noted
in this paper, in some respects the RED act offers North Carolina
employees greater protection than that provided by the federal
Act.
ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISION OF THE
RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACT
Scope for Analysis
This part informs about protection afforded by the Retaliatory
Employment Discrimination act" (RED act). The RED act pro-
tects any employee who suffers discrimination or retaliation follow-
ing his or her activity (or threatened activity) with respect to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina
(OSHANC).' 5
The RED act extends its protection beyond OSHANC. It also
protects employees from discrimination because of their activities
with respect to the:
(1) WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT."6 Regarding this act, an em-
ployee might, for example, suffer job retaliation for filing a claim
for a job related injury or illness.
(2) WAGE AND HOUR ACT.17 Regarding this act, an employee might
realize discrimination following a complaint about illegal deduc-
tions from a paycheck.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-240 to 95-244 (1992). The RED act supplanted
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(8)-(10), OSHANC's previous anti-discrimination
provision.
13. EMPLOYMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11,404 (1992).
14. Chapter 95, Article 21 of the General Statutes.
15. Chapter 95, Article 16 of the General Statutes.
16. Chapter 97 of the General Statutes.
17. Chapter 95, Article 2A of the General Statutes. The RED act supplanted
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.20, the Wage and Hour Act's previous anti-discrimination
provision.
1992]
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(3) MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT.'8 Regarding this act, an em-
ployee might be discriminated against for complaining about an
unsafe mine condition:
The scope for analysis here, however, is OSHANC and employees
covered by it.
Employees Covered v. Not Covered by OSHANC
Employees Not Covered by OSHANC
Federal government employees, and employees covered by
particular federal acts which specifically provide for job safety and
health protection, are not covered by OSHANC. Also excluded
from OSHANC coverage are employees in maritime operations.' 9
Employees Covered by OSHANC
Employees of public as well as private entities are covered by
OSHANC. This contrasts with the federal Act, which does not pro-
tect employees of government entities."0
In the private sector, North Carolina has a large number of
motor carrier employees. Those employees are protected from job
discrimination for safety and health activities by a federal statute
known as the Surface Transportation Assistance Act 2" (STAA).
Complaints filed under the STAA are processed by the federal gov-
ernment. 2  North Carolina motor carrier employees may be addi-
18. Chapter 74, Article 2A of the General Statutes. The RED act supplanted
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-24.15, the Mine Safety and Health Act's previous anti-dis-
crimination provision.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-128 (1992). See generally MICHAEL R. SMITH, OSHA
LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 1.6-1.16, 4.3 (2d ed. 1992). Certain small farming op-
erations and employers (with fewer than 11 employees) which meet specified in-
jury criteria are exempt from particular federal Act enforcement activities. The
appropriations act which funds enforcement of the federal Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
170, 105 Stat. 1107, (CCH) V 6281 (1991), prohibits use of the funds for enforce-
ment activities against exempted employers. However, with respect to qualified
employers with fewer than 11 employees, one of the exceptions to the OSHA en-
forcement exemption permits anti-discrimination actions. In North Carolina, en-
forcement activities are limited to those which can be financed by matching fed-
eral funds. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-128(6) (1992).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652, 653 (1993).
21. 49 U.S.C. App. §§ 2301-16 (1992). Example subjects of complaints by mo-
tor carrier employees include having to drive unsafe vehicles, to operate vehicles
in unsafe weather conditions, and to drive without a rest interval.
22. Complaints under the STAA can be filed, within 180 days of the alleged
[Vol. 15:29
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tionally covered under the RED act for protected OSHANC
activities."3
How the Analysis Proceeds
The RED act and OSHANC are North Carolina statutes. In a
civil action to enforce the RED act for discrimination for particular
employee activities with respect to OSHANC, the court would
probably examine analogous decisions of North Carolina courts.
The court may also consider legislative history, federal court deci-
sions regarding similar federal statutes, scholarly treatises, and the
practical realities of the situation at hand.24
One federal statute which the court would surely consider is
the anti-discrimination provision of the federal Act. That provision
is section 11(c) of the federal Act 25 and will be referred to here as §
11(c). Section 11(c)(1) reads:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or re-
lated to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any pro-
ceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of
himself or others of any right afforded by this Act.
The U.S. Secretary of Labor (Secretary) has established regu-
lations for guidance in the application of § 11(c). 6 The federal
discrimination, with the Regional Administrator, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 1375 Peachtree Street N.E., Suite 587, Atlanta, Georgia 30367, or
with the Area Director, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Century
Station, 300 Fayetteville Mall, Room 104, Raleigh, North Carolina 27601. If filed
with DOSH, the complaint would be referred to the federal government.
23. See Rodriguez v. Dura Freight, Inc., 1992 O.S.H.D. (CCH) 1 29,841 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1992) (Docket No. C009468). The STAA preempted the employee from
relief under California anti-discrimination law regarding protected OSH activities
and from relief under the common law theory of wrongful discharge. But cf.
Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989). The employee
alleged that the employer's actions had violated the STAA anti-discrimination
provision, but did not file for relief under the STAA. The employee was granted
relief under the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine, in
that the employer's actions violated several state statutes. Accord Parten v. Con-
solidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1991).
24. See, e.g., Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 382 S.E.2d 874,
review denied, 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989). (Note the analysis beginning
at 95 N.C. App. 229).
25. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 11(c) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)).
26. The regulations are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1977 (1992).
1992]
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courts accord the Secretary great deference with respect to inter-
pretations of the federal Act and its standards and regulations. In-
deed, if the regulation is ambiguous, the Secretary's interpretation
must prevail."
The RED act and § 11(c) are similar in many respects.
OSHANC and the federal Act are identical in many respects.
Wherever similarities exist, the Secretary's regulations interpreting
§ 11(c) will be used in this part to guide the analysii of the RED
act. Federal court decisions and other relevant information will
also be used.
The Analysis
No "PERSON" SHALL DISCRIMINATE
The RED act states that "no person shall discriminate or take
any retaliatory action because the employee in good faith does or
threatens to" exercise rights under OSHANC.! s The RED act de-
fines person as "any individual, partnership, association, corpora-
tion, business trust, legal representative, the State, a city, town,
county, municipality, local agency, or other entity of
government."29
The analogous' federal Act's definition of person3" is similar to
that found in the RED act. The U.S. Secretary of Labor has inter-
preted person as it relates to § 11(c) of the federal Act." The Sec-
retary interprets person in its broadest sense.2
Person is not limited to the employee's employer. A person
would be prohibited from discriminating against anyone's em-
ployee because of the employee's activities with respect to
OSHANC. Accordingly, such entities as labor organizations, em-
ployment agencies, and all other persons would be prohibited by
27. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(a) (1992).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-240(1) (1992).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 652 (1993). "[A person is] one or more individuals, partner-
ships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any or-
ganized group of persons." Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(16) (1992).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.4 (1992).
32. See, e.g., Donovan v. RCR Communications, Inc., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3398, 1985 O.S.H.D. (CCH) T 27,330 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (Docket No. 84-1252-Civ-T-
13) (defendants unsuccessfully argued that as corporate officials acting in their
corporate capacities, they were eliminated from § 11(c) jurisdiction over
"persons").
.[Vol. 15:29
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the RED act from discriminating against any employee for his or
her OSHANC activities.
No DISCRIMINATION OR RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST AN
"EMPLOYEE"
Questions may arise as to whether the subject of alleged dis-
crimination is an employee or is the respondent's employee.33 The
RED act does not define employee. For purposes of OSHANC, em-
ployee is defined as "an employee of an employer who is employed
in a business or other capacity of his employer, including any and
all business units and agencies owned and/or controlled by the em-
ployer." '34 OSHANC's definition of "employer" also facilitates un-
derstanding of who is considered an employee: "employer means a
person engaged in a business who has employees, including any
state or political subdivision of a state, but does not include the
employment of domestic workers employed in the place of resi-
dence of his or. her employer."3 5
"Employ" is not defined by the RED act or OSHANC. The
Safety and Health Review Board of North Carolina uses the "eco-
nomic realities test" to determine whether, for purposes of liability
for employees' safety and health, one is an independent contractor
or employee.36 Adhering to the U.S. Secretary of Labor's interpre-
tations with regard to § 11(c), 3 7 employ - with respect to the RED
act - would be construed in the broad sense of any employment
33. A federal district court held that § 11(c) did not protect a complainant
where the defendant company was not the employer. The complainant was an
engineer who was ordered off the job after lodging safety complaints with the
defendant. Lummus Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1358, 1980 O.S.H.D. (CCH)
24,465 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (Docket No. C 77-169).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(9) (1992).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-127(10) (1992). Thus, unlike § 11(c) of the federal
Act, the RED act considers one who works for a public entity to be an employee
to be protected, as well.
36. Brooks v. L.P. Cox Co. of Concord, Inc., 2 N.C.O.S.H.D. 836, 840 (1986).
The economic realities test, also used to identify the correct employer, asks such
questions as: (a) Whom do the workers consider their employer? (b) Who pays
the workers' wages? (c) Who has the responsibility to control the workers? (d)
Does the alleged employer have power to control the workers? (e) Does the al-
leged employer have the power to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions
of the workers? (f) Does the ability of the workers to increase their income de-
pend on efficiency rather than initiative, judgment, and foresight? (g) How are the
workers' wages established?
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5 (1992).
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relationship created by economic realities.
No DISCRIMINATION OR RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST A
REPRESENTATIVE OF AN EMPLOYEE
The RED act bars discrimination against any employee who
causes specified activities to be "initiated on an employee's be-
half" '38 or exercises any right afforded by OSHANC on behalf of
"any other employee." 39 Arguably, this language would include any
employee representative, authorized or not. It would definitely in-
clude an authorized employee representative.40
"Authorized employee representative" is not defined by the
RED act or OSHANC. The Rules of Procedure of the Safety and
Health Review Board of North Carolina, however, define that term
as "a labor organization whether local or international which has a
collective bargaining relationship" with the employee.41
No PERSON SHALL DISCRIMINATE OR TAKE "RETALIATORY ACTION"
The RED act prohibits any person from taking retaliatory ac-
tion against any employee who, in good faith, "does or threatens
to" exercise rights under OSHANC. Retaliatory action is defined
as "the discharge, suspension, demotion, retaliatory relocation of
an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an
employee in the terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits of
employment. 42
PROTECTED ACTIVITIES AND UNPROTECTED ACTIVITIES
Protected Activities
Relevant language within the RED act 43 which protects em-
ployees from discrimination for activities with respect to OSHANC
states that,
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(a)(2) (1992).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(a)(3) (1992).
40. Secretary of Labor v. Kennedy Tubular Products, 1977-1978 O.S.H.D.
(CCH) 1 21,843 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (Civil Action No. 75-1519). The federal district
court held that an employer's refusal to allow the elected union representative to
enter the workplace to discuss safety concerns violated the federal Act's anti-dis-
crimination provision.
41. SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, RULES OF PROCE-
DURE, Rule .0101(4) (24 N.C.A.C. 3.0101(4)).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-240(2) (1992).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241 (1992).
[Vol. 15:29
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(a) No person shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action
against an employee because the employee in good faith does or
threatens to do any of the following:
(1) File a claim or complaint, initiate any inquiry, investi-
gation, inspection, proceeding or other action, or testify or
provide information to any person with respect to any of
the following:
b. Article 16 of this Chapter [OSHANC].
(2) Cause any of the activities listed in subdivision (1) of
this subsection to be initiated on an employee's behalf.
(3) Exercise any right on behalf of the employee or any
other employee afforded by. . . Article 16 of this Chapter
[OSHANC] ... of the General Statutes.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The RED act protects employees against discrimination for their
activities "with respect to" OSHANC and for exercising any right
"afforded by" OSHANC.
The federal anti-discrimination provision, § 11(c), protects
employees against discrimination for their activities "related to"
the federal Act and for exercising rights "under" and/or "afforded
by" the Act. The U.S. Secretary of Labor has interpreted "related
to" to include protection for such activities as complaints to vari-
ous agencies with responsibility for job safety and health" and
complaints by workers to their employers."5 Employee complaints
to the union about workplace safety are protected activity.4 6 Simi-
larly, § 11(c) protection would extend to the employee who merely
causes activities related to the federal Act to occur. To illustrate,
an employee could provide others with information needed to set
activities in motion.47
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.9(b) (1992). See also American Atomics, Inc., 8 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 1243, 1980 O.S.H.D. (CCH) V 24,254 (D. Ariz. 1980) (Docket No. 79-
223-TUC-MAR).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.9(c) (1992). Complaints to employers are related to the
Act, regardless of whether the Act specifically protects such complaints. Marshall
v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
46. Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.10 (1992). In Donovan v. R.D. Andersen Constr. Co., 552
F. Supp. 249 (D. Kan. 1982), § 11(c) protection extended to an employee who was
dismissed following his conversation with a newspaper reporter. The employee's
information to the reporter on asbestos in the workplace led to the newspaper's
inquiry and subsequent article.
1992]
9
Smith: An Analysis of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act and
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
OSHANC provides employees numerous rights. Additional
rights derive from other sources, including OSHANC standards
and administrative and judicial resolutions (case law) of issues
which have arisen under OSHANC. As noted below, employees of
the agriculture industry must pursue some of their rights in differ-
ent ways. Migrant employees have additional rights.4 8
Training. Employees have the right to be trained and to complain
about the lack of training regarding aspects of their job which
might pose a hazard to them. The types of training employees may
be required to receive would vary with the nature of the job, but
examples of such training include: the proper use of respirators;
emergency and fire prevention techniques; safe working procedures
involving occupational noise exposure; how to handle and store liq-
uefied petroleum gases; the safe operation of particular machines;
how to detect the presence of hazardous chemicals; and how to in-
terpret a material safety data sheet (MSDS) regarding a hazardous
chemical.49
Standards. The development of job safety and health standards"
may be initiated by employees and employees may, in various
ways, become involved in proceedings regarding standards. Em-
ployees may: (a) Propose to the commissioner of labor that a safety
or health standard be developed; 51 (b) Participate in hearings
about standards which have been proposed by anyone;52 (c) Peti-
tion the commissioner of labor for a review of any standard be-
48. See, e.g., Migrant Housing Act of North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-
222 to -229 (1992).
49. To learn more about employee rights regarding training, see NC-OSHA
INDUSTRY GUIDE X, A GUIDE TO VOLUNTARY TRAINING AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
IN OSHA STANDARDS. (Bureau of Education, Training, and Technical Assistance,
Division of Occupational Safety and Health, North Carolina Department of La-
bor, Raleigh, North Carolina.)
50. For more information about OSHANC standards, see NORTH CAROLINA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS FOR GENERAL INDUSTRY; NORTH
CAROLINA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY. (Bureau of Education, Training, and Technical Assistance, Division of
Occupational Safety and Health, North Carolina Department of Labor.) See also
INTRODUCTION TO MIGRANT HOUSING INSPECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. (Bureau of
Migrant Housing, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, North Carolina
Department of Labor).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(2) (1992).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(2) (1992).
[Vol. 15:29
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lieved to affect them or other employees adversely;53 (d) Partici-
pate in any hearing concerning their employer's variance
application. 4 Employees must be notified by their employer of its
application to the commissioner of labor to be allowed to vary from
a standard (protect employees, in a manner other than that pre-
scribed" by the standard).55 Employees must be notified regardless
of whether the application is for a temporary variance or perma-
nent variance; 56 (e) Petition the commissioner of labor to review
any variance granted to their employer if the variance is thought to
affect them or other employees adversely;57 or (f) Within six
months of the issuance of a permanent variance, apply to the com-
missioner of labor, asking that the variance be revoked.5 8
Inspections. The category "inspections" invokes the entire gamut
of protected activities and rights. For example, employees may: (a)
Request that the commissioner of labor inspect their workplace re-
garding what they believe to be a violation of safety or health stan-
dards;59 (b) Report conditions which they believe to be imminent
dangers or extreme hazards by calling the Governor's toll free hot-
line (1-800-662-7952); (c) Ask that the complainant's name not be
revealed in any request made for an inspection of a workplace (the
plea for confidentiality must be honored);6 0 (d) Be free from dis-
crimination or retaliatory actions for having exercised the right to
request an inspection of the workplace (or for exercising any other
right guaranteed by OSHANC);6' or (e) Consult with the commis-
sioner of labor and his or her agents, including the compliance of-
ficer who inspects the workplace. 2
Citations. Citations may involve employees directly in proceedings.
Employees may: (a) See any citation received by their employer for
the alleged violation of a safety or health standard (the citation
should be posted at or near the place where the violation oc-
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(5) (1992).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(4) (1992).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(3) (1992).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-132(a)(4), 95-132(b)(1) (1992).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(5) (1992).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-132(b)(3) (1992).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-130(7), 95-136(d)(1) (1992).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-136(d)(1) (1992).
61. Chapter 95, Article 21 of the General Statutes.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-130(7), 95-136(d)(1) (1992).
1992]
11
Smith: An Analysis of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act and
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
curred); 3 or (b) Write to the commissioner of labor, contesting the
length of time allowed their employer for the correction of a viola-
tion of a safety and health standard."
Review. Employees may testify in review proceedings or become
directly involved as parties or intervenors. Employees may: (a) Ap-
pear before the Safety and Health Review Board of North Carolina
(board) as a party in any contest filed by their employer or by an
employee. (Employees of agricultural employers have the right to
appear before the Office of Administrative Hearings);65 (b) Partici-
pate as a party before the board when their employer petitions the
commissioner of labor for a modification (normally, a postpone-
ment) of the date set in the citation for the abatement of any vio-
lation of a safety or health standard;"6 (c) Appear as a party before
the board to contest particular aspects of a proposal between their
employer and the commissioner of labor to settle a citation;6 7 or
(d) Appeal to the North Carolina superior court any final board
decision which is counter to their interest in a contested case.68
Work conditions. Employees have a right to safe and healthful
working conditions.6 9 Employees may: (a) Ask the commissioner of
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(a) (1992).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-130(11), 95-137(b)(1) (1992).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-135(e) (1992). An employee of the agriculture indus-
try may contest (see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(5) (1988)) the length of the
abatement period established in a citation to his or her employer. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150B-23(a) (1992) also grants a person the right to initiate a contested case
before the Office of Administrative Hearings, if the person is aggrieved by a state
government agency. Initially, the agricultural employee's notice of contest would
be sent to the director of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health, North
Carolina Department of Labor, who will advise the employee of the right to file a
petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings. (Office of Administrative
'Hearings, 424 North Blount Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27601; (919) 733-
2698).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-137(b)(4) (1992).
67. SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 41,
Rules .0107(f), .0701(c). To learn more about employee rights with respect to the
Safety and Health Review Board of North Carolina, see the Rules of Procedure,
Safety and Health Review Board of North Carolina (Safety and Health Review
Board, 121 West Jones Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27603; (919) 733-3589).
See also MICHAEL R. SMITH, A GUIDE TO PROCEDURES OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REVIEW BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA (NC-OSHA INDUSTRY GUIDE R). (Bureau of
Education, Training, and Technical Assistance, Occupational Safety and Health
Division, North Carolina Department of Labor).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-141 (1992).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126(2), 95-129(1) (1992).
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labor to investigate if they believe they are being harmed by physi-
cal hazards or by exposure to toxic materials;70 (b) Gain access to
their exposure records, if exposed to toxic substances or harmful
physical agents (such records provide the results from tests which
monitored the effects of exposure);7' (c) Obtain their medical
records regarding their exposure to toxic substances or harmful
physical agents;72 (d) Ask for and receive a copy of their em-
ployer's hazard communication program if it uses chemicals which
would require it to have such a program; 73 (e) Obtain from their
employer the identity of any chemical with which they are re-
quired to work;74 (f) Assist the commissioner of labor in an inspec-
tion of the employer's hazardous chemicals (they are protected
from discharge and discrimination that may result from such assis-
tance); 5 or (g) Learn of any imminent danger in their place of em-
ployment, whenever it is discovered by an OSHA compliance
officer.78
Unsafe work, refusing to perform it. No language in the RED act
specifically protects employees who are disciplined for refusing to
perform allegedly unsafe work. Yet, the U.S. Secretary of Labor's
regulations require any state with its own occupational safety and
health plan to have an anti-discrimination provision as effective as
§ 11(c). 77
No language in the federal anti-discrimination provision spe-
cifically protects employees who refuse to perform unsafe work.
Under the U.S. Secretary of Labor's regulations, § 11(c) would not
normally protect an employee who is disciplined for refusing to
work because of perceived hazards. If, however, the danger were
too imminent to await correction through normal channels and the
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(6) (1992).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-143(c) (1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1992).
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1992).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1992). This hazard communication standard may
be obtained in booklet form free, from the Bureau of Education, Training, and
Technical Assistance, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, North Carolina
Department of Labor. Ask for the North Carolina Occupational Safety and
Health Hazard Communication Standard.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1992).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-196 (1992).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-140(c) (1992).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.23 (1992). If the state's anti-discrimination provision is
not as effective, the secretary of labor may assume jurisdiction over the employee
complainant.
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employer could not or would not correct the hazard, § 11(c) protec-
tion would apply."
From the tenor of the RED act, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the legislature intended to protect employees who in
good faith refuse to perform unsafe work if no viable alternative
exists. 9 If the RED act is construed such that employees are not
protected where they refuse work they believe is unsafe, an af-
fected employee might opt not to file a claim under the RED act.
Rather, the employee might seek relief through a private suit
against the employer."0
If an employee is discharged for refusing work which, if per-
formed would compromise public safety, the discharge might be
seen as a violation of public policy.8 Finally, judicially created law
known as the "public policy" exception to an employer's right to
fire an employee "at will" is evolving. The courts may well deter-
mine that discriminating against an employee for refusing to en-
78. The regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (1992), has been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
The Court characterized the protected right as "the right of an employee to
choose not to perform his assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of
death or serious injury coupled with a reasonable belief that no less drastic alter-
native is available." Id. at 3-4. A recent case which precisely meets four elements
which the employee must establish is Dole v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 752
F. Supp. 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), where the employee's suspension and eventual ter-
mination for refusal to operate a collating and binding machine violated § 11(c)
(reversed in part, to restore the full back pay owed the employee, Martin v.
H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 936 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1991)).79. Cf. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 416 S.E.2d 166 (1992). In
Amos, the Wage and Hour Act provided an avenue for employees to recover
wages of less than the minimum wage, if they continued working while pursuing
the act's remedy. If they refused to work for minimum wage and were fired, no
remedy was specifically available. It was apparent to the North Carolina Supreme
Court that "the intent of the legislature was to provide an employee an avenue to
recover back wages while remaining employed." Id. at 358, 416 S.E.2d at 172.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-244 (1992) states that "Nothing in this Article shall
be deemed to diminish the rights or remedies of any employee . . . at common
law." Regarding employee's who were discharged from their jobs, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has stated: "We hold therefore that absent ... the intent of
our state legislature to supplant the common law with exclusive statutory reme-
dies, the availability of alternative remedies does not prevent a plaintiff from
seeking tort remedies for wrongful discharge based on the public policy excep-
tion." Amos, 331 N.C. at 356-57, 416 S.E.2d at 171.
81. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 176, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447
(1989) (employee's work related to the safety of citizens traveling the public
highways).
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gage in unsafe work violates public policy, despite the nature of
the work. 2
Unprotected Activities
Engaging in protected activities does not immunize the em-
ployee from adverse actions grounded in legitimate reasons.8 3 The
RED act does not restrain an employer from discharging, de-
moting, or suspending an employee if, regardless of the employee's
protected activities, the adverse action would have been taken for
legitimate reasons.8 4 Further, assuming the basis for adverse action
by the employer (or others) were not legitimate, the basis may
nonetheless be unrelated to OSHANC and not protected by the
RED act."5
If it is shown, however, that the employee engaged in pro-
82. Amos, 331 N.C. at 353, 416 S.E.2d at 169. "Although the definition of
'public policy' approved by this Court does not include a laundry list of what is or
is not 'injurious to the public or against the public good,' at the very least public
policy is violated when an employee is fired in contravention of express policy
declarations contained in the North Carolina General Statutes." In view of this
language, OSHANC, at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(2) (1992), appears pertinent:
"The General Assembly of North Carolina declares it to be its purpose and policy
through the exercise of its powers to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the State of North Carolina safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources."
83. Examples of legitimate reasons for adverse actions, listed by the legisla-
ture in the Workers' Compensation Act (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(c)(1991)), in-
cluded "willful or habitual tardiness or absence from work or being disorderly or
intoxicated while at work, or destructive of an employer's property." The U.S.
secretary of labor's regulations hold that § 11(c) does not protect employees who
refuse to comply with their employer's safety rules and regulations. 29 C.F.R. §
1977.22 (1992). OSHANC requires employees to obey its standards. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-130(1) (1992). Well established case law makes particular defenses to
OSHANC citations unavailable to employers who fail to discipline employees for
safety rule violations. See MICHAEL R. SMITH, supra note 19, §§ 5.7-5.13 (citing
North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Decisions).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(b) (1992).
85. See U.S. secretary of labor's interpretation. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(a) (1992).
See also Express Container Serv., Inc., 1980 O.S.H.D. (CCH) 24,765 (E.D. Va.
1980) (Civil Action No. 79-1017-N) (employee attempted to use § 11(c) for protec-
tion where protected activities were not involved). Nonetheless, if the basis for
adverse action was not legitimate and not prohibited by the RED act, the em-
ployee still may be protected by other North Carolina statutes (see generally L.
LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1989 & Supp.) for a comprehensive list of North Car-
olina statutes which prohibit job discrimination for various reasons); and by com-
mon law remedies.
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tected activity and the protected activity was a substantial causa-
tive factor in the adverse action against the employee, the burden
of proof shifts to the employer.8 6 The employer must then show
that the same adverse action would have been taken for legitimate
reasons, notwithstanding the employee's involvement in the pro-
tected activity.87
In assessing whether the employer carried its burden of proof,
the courts look for such evidence as speciousness (employees of
less seniority were retained when the employee complainant was
dismissed, allegedly as a result of work force reduction),8 8 (employ-
ees involved in similar allegedly unsafe work practices were re-
tained, while the employee complainant was dismissed);89 pretext
(poor work habits ascribed to the complainant employee but no
record that they were considered prior to the discrimination);"
and employer statements (such as threatening to make it difficult
for the employee complainant to find other employment)."'
Employees who engage in activity protected under OSHANC
must remain no worse off than if they had not engaged in the ac-
tivity. Yet, there is no intention that the protected activity should
cause the employee to be better off..The North Carolina Court of
Appeals has said: "This Court is not unmindful that circumstantial
evidence is often the only evidence available to show retaliation
against protected activity. Nevertheless, the causal connection
must be something more than speculation; otherwise, the com-
plaining employee is clothed with immunity for future misconduct
and is 'better off' for having filed the complaint rather than merely
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(b) (1992). See Marshall v. Commonwealth
Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) for
relevant discussion on burden of proof with respect to § 11(c).
87. Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 230 & 234-35, 382 S.E.2d
874, review den., 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989), citing Mt. Healthy City
Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Stroh involved the OSHANC anti-
discrimination provision which existed prior to the RED act and which was al-
most identical to the federal § 11(c).
88. Marshall v. Chapel Electric Co., 1980 O.S.H.D. (CCH) 1 24,157 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (Docket No. C-3-79-20).
89. Marshall v. P & Z Co., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1587, 1978 O.S.H.D. (CCH)
1 22,579 (D.D.C. 1978) (Docket No. 76-0609), aff'd, No. 12771, slip. op. 1979
O.S.H.D. (CCH) 1 24,087 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
90. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. at 691.
91. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 1982 O.S.H.D. (CCH) 25,895 (D. Conn. 1982)
(Docket No. H-81-397).
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being no 'worse off.' "92
PROCEDURE UNDER THE, RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ACT
Summary of Procedure
Procedure under the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination
(RED) act might be abridged in this manner: (a) an employee files
a complaint; the commissioner of labor's (commissioner's) investi-
gation fails to substantiate the complaint, it is dismissed, and the
employee is allowed to file a civil suit against the alleged offender
(respondent); or (b) the investigation substantiates the complaint
and the violation of the RED act is resolved informally; or (c).con-
ciliation efforts fail and the commissioner either files suit on the
employee's behalf, or does not file suit but allows the employee to
file suit against the respondent.
92. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. at 237, 382 S.E.2d at 882. This decision
is probably as rich as any analysis of the issue of employer motivation. Here, the
employee, an electrician, had twice failed to follow company safety rules, and cre-
ated potentially life-threatening situations. Similar incidents involving other em-
ployees had resulted in employee disciplinary actions. The employer's decision to
dismiss the employee followed a meeting during which the employee refused to
accept that his job performance was unacceptable.
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Schematically, procedure under the RED act appears like this:
Within 180 days of alleged violation:
Employee complaint is filedi
Within 20 days of receiving complaint:
Commission notifies respondent
Within 90 days of the complaint: Commissioner
investigates complaint and determines that
Reasonable cause does
not exist
Complaint is dismissed:
Parties are notified and
right-to-sue letter is sent to
employee
Employee abandons com-
plaint
or
Within 90 days of issuance
of right-to-sue letter,
employee files civil action
in superior court
Reasonable cause exists
Informal conferences
eliminate the alleged
violation; or
Parties are notified that
conciliation failed
Within 90 days of notify-
ing parties, commis-
sioner files civil action
Employee is sent a right-
to-sue letter
Filing the Complaint
The employee may file a complaint alleging a violation of the
RED act. A representative may also file on the employee's behalf.
9 3
FORM; WHERE TO FILE
No particular form of complaint is specified. The RED act
does state that an employee "may file a written complaint." How-
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(a)(2) (1992). See also U.S. secretary of labor's
regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(a) (1992).
I
t.
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ever, current practice is to accept oral complaints, as well. 4 A writ-
ten complaint is preferable because it eliminates questions regard-
ing timeliness. 5 An oral complaint may be effected by telephone or
by addressing it personally to the North Carolina Commissioner of
Labor, Director of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health
(DOSH), or any DOSH agent, such as a compliance officer.96
TIMELINESS
The RED act specifies that the complaint "shall be filed
within 180 days of the alleged violation. '97 The U.S. Secretary of
Labor's regulations allow for the tolling of the filing period if there
are grounds to justify a suspension. 8 The requirement to file
"within 180 days of the alleged violation" may be interpreted as
when the employee first learns of the discrimination. A federal
court of appeals has held that the filing period (for § 11(c) pur-
poses) began when an employee learned that he had been fired
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(a) (1992). It is not clear whether the permissive
word "may" merely confers a right to file a complaint which must be written or
presumes that an oral complaint is an acceptable alternative. The U.S. secretary
of labor's practice is to allow oral complaints. See Employment Safety and Health
Guide (CCH) 7978.100; OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. 10, A.2.c.
95. A written complaint should be addressed to the Bureau of Compliance,
Division of Occupational Safety and Health,. North Carolina Department of La-
bor, 413 North Salisbury Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27603-5942 [(919) 733-
3087.]
96. Telephone discussion with the acting director (discrimination supervisor)
of the DOSH discrimination complaint program, September 21, 1992. Chapter 10
of the DOSH FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL provides for oral complaints and for
complaints to be acceptable if lodged with agents of DOSH. Chapter 10 was
drafted to implement the OSHANC anti-discrimination provision existing prior to
the RED act. Nonetheless, Chapter 10 is followed, is a public document, and is
very educational. For example, it informs of DOSH's use of the federal "Section
11(c)/405 Investigator Manual."
97. This time period offers North Carolina employees greater protection than
previously afforded by OSHANC (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-130(9) allowed 30 days);
employees under the federal Act (§ 11(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1992)) are pres-
ently allowed 30 days.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(d) (1992). The employee may have been misled about
grounds for adverse action, or the adverse action may have been of a continuing
nature rather than a discrete occurrence. The secretary does not consider the pen-
dency of grievance-arbitration proceedings or decision of another agency grounds
for tolling. Chapter 10 of the DOSH FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL also lists reasons
which would and would not justify late filing. One reason that would not justify
late filing is where the complaint is lodged with federal OSHA, unless that agency
simply failed to forward the complaint to DOSH.
19921
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rather than laid off, as he had been misled to believe. 99
Receipt of the Complaint
Upon receiving the complaint, the commissioner of labor
(commissioner) must notify the respondent and investigate to de-
termine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the em-
ployee's allegation is true. The RED act does not specify the type
or extent of the commissioner's investigation. 100
Under current practice, the investigation begins with DOSH
contacting the employee to determine whether (without disproof) a
violation appears to exist. If the complaint is timely, the employee
engaged in protected activity, and subsequently the employee suf-
fered adverse action, the investigation will proceed. 101 DOSH will
follow with a visit to the respondent. Evidence, such as witnesses'
accounts, will be received to determine whether the employee's al-
legations can be substantiated.
Acting on the Complaint
Within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the commissioner
shall make a determination.102 If reasonable cause to substantiate
99. Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman Harness, Inc., 736 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir.
1984).
100. A federal district court has held that the extent of investigation con-
ducted for § 11(c) purposes is a matter for the U.S. secretary of labor's discretion.
Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
101. Telephone discussion with the acting discrimination supervisor of the
DOSH discrimination program, September 21, 1992. See also DOSH FIELD OPER-
ATIONS MANUAL, Ch. 10.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(a) (1992). The Red act is not clear as to
whether the 90 days for determination refers to: (a) the time in which to assess
the credibility of the complaint, or (b) the time for assessing the credibility of the
complaint and resolving the complaint informally, or (c) the time for resolving the
complaint informally. It seems reasonable that the 90 day period addresses both
the time for assessing the credibility of the complaint and resolving the complaint
informally because: (1) the requirement to "make a determination" within 90
days (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(a) (1992)) and (2) an additional 90 days after
notifying the parties of the failure of conciliation efforts before the commissioner
must decide to file suit (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-243(b) (1992)) equal 180 days. That
180 days is also the time which an employee must wait before requesting a right-
to-sue letter if the commissioner has not acted (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(c)
(1992)). Whatever its referent, the U.S. secretary of labor interprets a similar pro-
vision at § 11(c)(3) as directory, rather than as an unyielding deadline. See 29
C.F.R. § 1977.16 (1992).
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the complaint is unavailable, the commissioner will notify the par-
ties, dismiss the complaint, and issue to the employee a right-to-
sue letter. This letter confers upon the employee a private right to
sue the alleged offender. 103
If reasonable cause to substantiate the complaint is available,
the commissioner will attempt to "remove the alleged violation" by
informal means. 0' The effort will be to restore the employee to the
position occupied prior to suffering the adverse action. Many em-
ployee complainants will have by then accepted other employment
and may instruct DOSH to initiate a settlement for such consider-
ation as an expunged record and back pay.
0 5
If the commissioner's conciliation efforts fail, the commis-
sioner must notify the parties in writing, then either file a civil
action on the employee's behalf or issue the employee a right-to-
sue letter.' 6 Again, this letter confers upon the employee a private
right to sue the alleged offender.
Civil Action
The commissioner of labor can file a civil suit on the em-
ployee's behalf within 90 days of notifying the parties of the failure
of conciliation efforts. The employee can file a civil action within
90 days of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter.'0 7 If the commis-
sioner of labor has not acted within 180 days from when the com-
plaint was filed, the employee may make a written request for a
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(a) (1992). No private right of action exists for
employees under the federal Act. See Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th
Cir. 1980).
104. The confidentiality of informal proceedings is guaranteed, unless waived
by the written consent of all parties. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(d) (1992).
105. Settlement efforts play a significant role. Chapter 10 of both the DOSH
and the federal OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL state that "Settlement efforts
are most successful when promptly initiated before large backpay liabilities ac-
crue and positions harden."
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(b) (1992). In contrast, assuming no settlement,
the.U.S. secretary of labor is required by § 11(c)(2) to sue on the employee's be-
half. To be as effective as § 11(c), it may develop that the commissioner of labor
will have to file suit for all valid complaints. However, there may well be circum-
stances where the North Carolina employee would benefit from filing a private
suit, and exercise that preference to do so. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-243(b) (1992).
107. A right-to-sue letter will be issued if there is not reasonable cause to
believe the complaint or if conciliation efforts fail and the commissioner does not
file an action on the employee's behalf.
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right-to-sue letter.1"8
The employee may simultaneously seek relief through collec-
tive bargaining efforts and/or through other agencies. Such efforts,
however, will not cause the commissioner of labor to delay enforce-
ment, including the filing of a civil action during the pendency of
other proceedings.109 On the other hand, the employee's acceptance
of remedies through such mechanisms as arbitration-grievance pro-
cedures may bar remedies through the employee's civil action.1 0
Withdrawal of a complaint cannot be suggested or encouraged
by DOSH.11' If the employee voluntarily withdraws the complaint,
the commissioner's right to file a civil action is not necessarily fore-
closed." 2 The commissioner may be able to retain jurisdiction be-
cause RED act enforcement serves a broad public policy. '
TYPES OF RELIEF
The employee or the commissioner may ask the court to: (a)
Enjoin the continued violation of the RED act; (b) Reinstate the
employee to the previously held or equivalent job position; (c) Re-
store all fringe benefits and seniority rights; (d) Compensate the
employee for lost wages 14 and expenses related to the adverse ac-
tion; and (e) Award attorneys' fees and other costs related to the
civil action.1 5
If the court determines that the offender willfully 6 violated
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-242(c) (1992). Note that the act does not require
the commissioner to honor the request.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-244 (1992). Also see the U.S. secretary of labor's
regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18(a)(1) (1992).
110. See Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 240, 382 S.E.2d 874,
883, review denied, 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989).
111. DOSH FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. 10. Also see analogous § 11(c)
discussion in the federal OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. 10, 3.g.
112. For related information, see the U.S. secretary of labor's regulations at
29 C.F.R. § 1977.17 (1992).
113. See relevant discussion regarding the prior OSHANC anti-discrimina-
tion provision in Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. at 238, 382 S.E.2d at 882.
114. A federal district court has held that an employer's offer to reinstate an
employee did not stop the accrual of back pay because the proffered job was not
equivalent to the employee's prior job. Donovan v. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562
F. Supp. 548 (D. Conn. 1982).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-243(c) (1992).
116. One definition of willful is: "A violation is deemed to be willful when
there is shown 'a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty necessary to the
safety of the person or property of another.' " Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 297,
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the RED act, the court shall treble compensation for lost wages
and expenses related to the adverse action. An injured employee
might also be successful at seeking punitive damages in lieu of
treble damages if there is evidence of a willful violation.'
1 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that "absent...
the intent of our state legislature to supplant the common law with
exclusive statutory remedies, the availability of alternative reme-
dies does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking tort remedies for
wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception. The avail-
ability of alternative common law and statutory remedies, we be-
lieve, supplements rather than hinders the ultimate goal of pro-
tecting employees who have been fired in violation of public
policy." ,
It is clear that the RED act did not intend to supplant com-
mon law remedies. To the opposite, it affirmatively states that
"[N]othing in this Article shall be deemed to diminish the rights or
remedies of any employee under . . . common law." 19
182 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1971), quoting Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 191, 148 S.E.
36, 37 (1929). See also 22 STRONG'S N.C. INDEX 4TH Negligence § 13.
117. "In this State, punitive damages can be recovered only for tortuous con-
duct and then only on proof that the defendant acted to cause plaintiff's injury
willfully, with malice, or with a reckless disregard for plaintiff's rights." Sides v.
Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 348, 328 S.E.2d 818, 830 (1985).
118. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 356-57, 416 S.E.2d 166, 171
(1992).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-244 (1992).
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APPENDIX
RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
(CHAPTER 95, ARTICLE 21,
NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES)
§ 95-240. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply in this Article:
(1) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, cor-
poration, business trust, legal representative, the State, a city,
town, county, municipality, local agency, or other entity of
government.
(2) "Retaliatory action" means the discharge, suspension, demo-
tion, retaliatory relocation of an employee, or other adverse em-
ployment action taken against an employee in the terms, condi-
tions, privileges, and benefits of employment.
§ 95-241. DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED
(a) No person shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action
against an employee because the employee in good faith does or
threatens to do any of the following:
(1) File a claim or complaint, initiate any inquiry, investigation,
inspection, proceeding or other action, or testify or provide infor-
mation 'to any person with respect to any of the following:
a. Chapter 97 of the General Statutes.
b. Article 2A or Article 16 of this Chapter.
c. Article 2A of Chapter 74 of the General Statutes.
(2) Cause any of the activities listed in subdivision (1) of this sub-
section to be initiated on an employee's behalf.
(3) Exercise any right on behalf of the employee or any other em-
ployee afforded by Article 2A or Article 16 of this Chapter or by
Article 2A of Chapter 74 of the General Statutes.
(b) It shall not be a violation of this Article for a person to dis-
charge or take any other unfavorable action with respect to an
employee who has engaged in protected activity as set forth under
this Article if the person proves by the greater weight of the evi-
dence that it would have taken the same unfavorable action in
the absence of the protected activity of the employee.
§ 95-242. COMPLAINT; INVESTIGATION; CONCILIATION
(a) An employee allegedly aggrieved by a violation of G.S. 95-241
may file a written complaint with the Commissioner of Labor al-
[Vol. 15:29
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/2
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
leging the violation. The complaint shall be filed within 180 days
of the alleged violation. Within 20 days following receipt of the
complaint, the Commissioner shall forward a copy of the com-
plaint to the person alleged to have committed the violation and
shall initiate an investigation. If the Commissioner determines af-
ter the investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe
that the allegation is true, the Commissioner shall dismiss the
complaint, promptly notify the employee and the respondent, and
issue a right-to-sue letter to the employee that will enable the
employee to bring a civil action pursuant to G.S. 95-243. If the
Commissioner determines after investigation that there is reason-
able cause to believe that the allegation is true, the Commissioner
shall attempt to eliminate the alleged violation by informal meth-
ods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. The Commis-
sioner shall make a determination as soon as possible and, in any
event, not later than 90 days after the filing of the complaint.
(b) If the Commissioner is unable to resolve the alleged violation
through the informal procedures, the Commissioner shall notify
the parties in writing that conciliation efforts have failed. The
Commissioner shall then either file a civil action on behalf of the
employee pursuant to G.S. 95-243 or issue a right-to-sue letter to
the employee enabling the employee to bring a civil action pursu-
ant to G.S. 95-243.
(c) An employee may make a written request to the Commis-
sioner for a right-to-sue letter after 180 days following the filing
of a complaint if the Commissioner has not issued a notice of con-
ciliation failure and has not commenced an action pursuant to
G.S. 95-242.
(d) Nothing said or done during the course of these informal pro-
cedures may be made public by the Commissioner or used as evi-
dence in a subsequent proceeding under this Article without the
written consent of the persons concerned.
§ 95-243. CIVIL ACTION
(a) An employee who has been issued a right-to-sue letter or the
Commissioner of Labor may commence a civil action in the supe-
rior court of the county where the violation occurred, where the
complainant resides, or where the respondent resides or has his
principal place of business.
(b) A civil action under this section shall be commenced by an
employee within 90 days of the date upon which the right-to-sue
letter was issued or by the Commissioner within 90 days of the
date on which the Commissioner notifies the parties in writing
that conciliation efforts have failed.
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(c) The employee or the Commissioner may seek and the court
may award any or all of the following types of relief:
(1) An injunction to enjoin continued violation of this
Article.
(2) Reinstatement of the employee to the same position
held before the retaliatory action or discrimination or to
an equivalent position.
(3) Reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority
rights.
(4) Compensation for lost wages, lost benefits, and other
economic losses that were proximately caused by the re-
taliatory action or discrimination.
If in an action under this Article the court finds that
the employee was injured by a willful violation of G.S. 95-
241, the court shall treble the amount awarded under
subdivision (4) of this subsection.
The court may award to the plaintiff and assess against the
defendant the reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys'
fees, of the plaintiff in bringing an action pursuant to this section.
If the court determines that the plaintiff's action is frivolous, it
may award to the defendant and assess against the plaintiff the
reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, of the
defendant in defending the action brought pursuant to this
section.
(d) Parties to a civil action brought pursuant to this section shall
have the right to a jury trial as provided under G.S. 1A-1, Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(e) An employee may only bring an action under this section
when he has been issued a right-to-sue letter by the
Commissioner.
§ 95-244. EFFECT OF ARTICLE ON OTHER RIGHTS
Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to diminish the rights
or remedies of any employee under any collective bargaining
agreement, employment contract, other statutory rights or reme-
dies, or at common law.
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